A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures by Colb, Sherry F.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
3-1-1994
A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does
Not Define the Limits of the Right Against
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Sherry F. Colb
Cornell Law School, sfc44@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colb, Sherry F., "A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures" (1994). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 627.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/627
A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHY
PROPERTY DOES NOT DEFINE THE LIMITS
OF THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Sherry F. Colb*
Imagine for a moment that it is the year 2020. An American
company has developed a mind-reading device, called the "brain wave
recorder" ("BWR"). The BWR is a highly sensitive instrument that
detects electrical impulses from any brain within ten feet of the
machine. Though previously thought impossible, the BWR can discern
the following information about the target individual: (1) whether he
or she is happy, sad, anxious, depressed, or irritable; (2) whether he or
she is even slightly sexually aroused; (3) whether he or she is taking
any medication (and if so, what the medication is); (4) if a female
subject, whether she is pregnant; (5) whether he or she is experiencing
a feeling of guilt or remorse; and (6) whether he or she is having
aggressive impulses toward another person or persons. At this stage in
its development, we do not know whether or not the BWR will
advance beyond detection of this information and whether or not it
will become generally available to the public. It is currently a
technology that belongs exclusively to the government and to
extremely wealthy private collectors.
Under Professor Orin Kerr's provocative and interesting thesis,'
federal or state police could use the BWR on innocent people without
implicating their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
* Professor of Law and Judge Frederick B. Lacey Scholar at Rutgers Law School-
Newark. A.B. 1988, Columbia (Valedictorian); J.D. 1991, Harvard (magna cum laude). -
Ed. The author gratefully acknowledges Michael C. Dorf, for his extremely helpful
comments, suggestions, and feedback, and William O'Sullivan, for his expert research
assistance. Thanks are also due to the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their excellent
work. This project was funded in part by the Dean's Summer Research Fund of Rutgers Law
School-Newark. Finally, the author thanks Orin S. Kerr, for his eloquent and thought-
provoking article. In this response, Professor Colb has taken the opportunity to articulate
some of her own views on the subject at issue. As a result, some of her arguments do not
directly contradict Professor Kerr's positions (at least not those expressed in the published
version of his article). Also, in the interest of giving Professor Kerr the last word, Professor
Colb has not advanced a rebuttal of his reply. She hopes and believes that her response piece
stands on its own.
1. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 799, 855-86 (2004).
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searches and seizures.2 To be more concrete, if, for example, the police
were to utilize the BWR to determine whether John Doe - a man
who neighbors say seems "strange" and doesn't "fit in" - feels
sexually aroused when he is in the presence of women, the man could
not complain of an invasion of any Fourth Amendment reasonable
expectation of privacy.
On Kerr's analysis, while existing Fourth Amendment doctrine
nominally protects normatively and empirically reasonable
expectations of privacy, in practice, in almost all cases, the doctrine
protects only property (in a broad and flexible sense, so that it includes
rented spaces, for example) but not privacy. Because the BWR reads
Doe's internal state without physically trespassing on his property, the
regulation of its use - as a matter of most of the case law - should be
left to Congress. As a normative matter, Kerr proposes that the
Supreme Court defer to Congress in the area of handling the privacy
implications of evolving technologies.
The Supreme Court and other judicial bodies, according to Kerr,
would have a difficult time understanding the mechanics of how the
BWR works or the context in which it might be used, whether by
private people or by law enforcement.' Moreover, the courts would be
unlikely even to reach the issue of how the Fourth Amendment
2. Though Kerr acknowledges that cases such as United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
(1984), United States v. Knotts, 400 U.S. 276 (1983), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001), might limit the use of such technologies, Kerr, supra note 1, at 830, he deems them
departures from the Court's usual approach and explains them as linked to property rights
with which the information disclosed was ordinarily associated, though not to any extant
property right with which the technology interferes. This characterization, however, has no
explanatory power, because any time one invades privacy without actually interfering with
property rights, it is possible to characterize the invasion of privacy at a level of generality
that associates it with some traditional property right. For example, the BWR device could
be described as an attack on property rights by noting that it exposes information that
traditionally could be obtained only by seizing a person's journals. Kerr's phrase "property,
broadly construed" thus gives us no information, except post hoc, about whether the Court
might see fit to extend Fourth Amendment protection to it.
3. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 871-83. Kerr describes several examples of courts struggling
to understand new technologies. Id. at 876. For example, in United States v. Bach, 2001 WL
1690055 (D. Minn. Dec 14, 2001), rev'd 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's finding that the Fourth Amendment
required law enforcement presence at an Internet Service Provider's facility during a search
for information on the ISP's servers. Kerr, supra note 1, at 876-77. Kerr asserts that "[t]he
district court judge apparently assumed that the skills required to search a computer server
are similar to the skills required to search physical property." Id. at 877.
Similarly, in Trulock v. Freeh, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
a girlfriend's consent to the search of a computer that she shared with her boyfriend did not
allow law enforcement officials to search the boyfriend's password-protected files stored on
that computer. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 879 (citing 275 F. 3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001)). Kerr
criticizes the court's decision because it failed to discuss the technical details about password-
protection necessary to articulate exactly what the court found to be improper. Kerr, supra
note 1, at 878-80. Kerr suggests "that the judges.., simply didn't understand enough about
the technology of password-protection to know that their opinion left the rule unclear." Id.
at 880.
[Vol. 102:889
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applies to the BWR for many years after its appearance on the
technological scene. Congress would therefore represent (and has
historically represented) a better source of protection for our privacy
from hi-tech government intrusion than the judiciary.
In one sense, the source of our privacy does not seem to matter
very much. Most people would presumably want to be protected from
the use of the BWR, particularly when the government lacks probable
cause or some other articulable basis for suspecting the individual
targeted. But if we were effectively protected from such intrusion, then
the fact that it was Congress doing the protecting rather than the
courts would probably not make much of a difference in people's lives.
Indeed, most Americans probably do not even know - when they
think about particular privacy rights - whether those rights exist as a
matter of statutory or constitutional law.
The question for courts, however, and for those like Professor Kerr
and myself who study the constitutional law of criminal procedure, is
not whether robust privacy protection from Congress is somehow
better or worse than what courts can provide. The appropriate
question is whether courts have (and whether they ought to have) an
obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment to new technologies5 that
could invade privacy without physically trespassing on anyone's
private property. Kerr answers this question no, and I answer it yes.
Because I like to draw links between substantive and procedural
privacy,6 I cannot resist drawing a comparison between Kerr's
proposal regarding technology and the Fourth Amendment, on the
one hand, and arguments about abortion and substantive due process,
on the other. If the Supreme Court had decided Roe v. Wade7
4. See id. at 866-69. Kerr describes several examples of considerable time elapsing
between the emergence of a new technology and the court's consideration of any resulting
Fourth Amendment implications. For example, Kerr observes, "[t]he Supreme Court first
considered the Fourth Amendment implications of wiretaps almost six decades after the
invention of the telephone. Pen registers were in widespread use by the 1960s, but the
Supreme Court did not pass on whether their use violated the Fourth Amendment until
1979." Id. at 867 (citations omitted). Kerr further notes:
Even today, no Article III court at any level has decided whether an Internet user has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mails stored with an Internet service provider;
whether encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy; or what the Fourth
Amendment implications of the 'Carnivore' Internet surveillance tool might be.
Id. at 867-68 (citations omitted).
5. Kerr limits his proposal to new and rapidly changing technologies. See id. passim.
Given short product cycles for nearly everything, new technologies will almost invariably
undergo rapid change. Accordingly, I refer here simply to new technologies.
6. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1644 (1998) (urging "a vision of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement that contains both substantive and procedural
safeguards").
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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differently, some argue, state and/or federal law might well have
protected the right to abortion.8 Such protection would have been
more legitimate than what the Supreme Court offered, critics suggest,
because it would have emerged from a fact-sensitive body more able
to give a nuanced consideration to all of the medical and technological
dimensions of the problem.'
In a dissenting opinion in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.," for example, Justice O'Connor suggested
that, with advances in technology that push fetal viability earlier into
pregnancy, the trimester framework established by Roe was "clearly
on a collision course with itself."'1 She thereby implied that the Court
- by protecting the right to abortion - had ventured into territory
where it lacked competence and in which it would continually have to
revise its judgments. 2 The argument is similar to Kerr's regarding
technological invasions of privacy. Justice O'Connor, moreover, also
thought that legislative judgment would generally be more appropriate
than judicial decisionmaking. Crucially, however, she was not willing
(as Kerr is) to defer to state legislatures or Congress in the area of
rapidly changing technologies. 3
I. DOCTRINE
In evaluating Kerr's thesis, let us first consider the doctrinal claim.
Kerr says that notions of property rather than privacy have driven the
post-Katz decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 4 He supports
& See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 42-43
(1987); ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS ABORTION
DEBATABLE? 126-27 (1993)Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1185, 1208 (1992).
9. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 8, at 47-50.
10. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
11. Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12. But cf. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 343 (2003), forecasting a twenty-five-year limit to the need for (and therefore,
potentially, the constitutional validity of) affirmative action in public higher education.
13. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 465. O'Connor stated that:
[Iln determining whether the State imposes an "undue burden," we must keep in mind
that when we are concerned with extremely sensitive issues... "the appropriate forum
for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature."... This does not mean
that.., we defer to the judgments made by state legislatures .... Rather, that when we
face a complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers we do well to
pay careful attention to how the other branches of Government have addressed the
same problem.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 828-30. Kerr asserts that after Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967),
[Vol. 102:889
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this claim by attempting to demonstrate that a large number of the
cases supposedly decided under the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" framework are in truth more faithful to property law, broadly
construed, than they are to privacy. There are a few reasons to
question this claim, however, one of which is ultimately a matter of
interpreting precedents.
First, in explaining its decisions, the Court refers repeatedly to
"reasonable expectations of privacy" rather than to property, in the
cases following Katz. These references may indeed reflect only some
misguided need to profess fidelity to the Katz decision (or at least to
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in that case), while in fact
pursuing the property-based reasoning that animated the law prior to
Katz. Certainly, this explanation could provide an account of the
failure of the Court's precedents to live up to the promise of Katz, a
failure that is acknowledged by both supporters of and detractors from
the privacy approach.15
On the other hand, it seems peculiar that the Court would pursue a
property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment, one that it had
previously embraced, and simultaneously pay lip service to a privacy-
based approach that may - as Kerr suggests 16 - not even be
necessary to the Katz decision itself. If the Court were truly interested
in applying the Fourth Amendment only to property it could easily
have said so and thereby pursued its agenda openly.
As Kerr acknowledges, the Court does sometimes decide cases in a
manner that seems to reflect its consideration of privacy rather than
These cases suggest that courts generally do not engage in creative normative
inquiries into privacy and technological change when applying the Fourth
Amendment to new technologies. For better or for worse, courts have tended to
apply the same property-based principles to such cases that they have applied
elsewhere.
Id. at 829.
15. Both supporters of and detractors from Katz have argued that the cases supposedly
following Katz did not carry out the expected privacy revolution. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note
1, at 818 n.99 (citing James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privocy Province, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 645, 647
(1985); Jonathan Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug
Business: Thermal Imaging, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1437, 1454 (1996); and Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the
Fourth Amendment. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 127, 131 (2000)).
16. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 819-24. Kerr states that "for my purpose here, the trick is
to note that Katz is correctly decided from the standpoint of [a] loose property-based
approach." Id. at 820. Additionally, Kerr argues that attaching things to a person's property
(here, the phone booth would be Katz's property for the duration of his telephone call,
supported by his payment of the toll) is an invasion of property rights under Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982), which said it was a taking to attach a
cable box to a person's roof.
March 20041
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property concerns.17 As Kerr notes, though, some of the cases
protecting (or finding no reasonable expectation of) privacy are also
equally defensible on property grounds" - but this should come as no
surprise. There has long been significant overlap between property
rights and reasonable expectations of privacy. Privacy is one of the
things that people value about private property. We cherish the right
to exclude others not only from using our privately owned (or rented)
spaces, but also from occupying and observing us within our private
spaces. For instance, to avoid being observed while engaged in private
activities (or to be free of observation even when they have no
particular private activity to pursue), people can enter their homes and
shut the door. People can hide personal items in their houses or cars or
hotel rooms and thereby prevent others from knowing of those items.
Protecting property, in other words, has in the past largely
encompassed protecting privacy as well, and it is thus misleading to
characterize the Fourth Amendment, textually or historically, as
relevant to property but not to privacy.
As Kerr shows, however, new technology unmoors privacy from
property. Now threats to privacy can arise without in any way
implicating rights to private property. Intercepting email
communications, utilizing thermal detection devices, and applying my
17. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-40 (2001) (finding that police use of
an infrared thermal imager to identify hot spots on the outside surface of a suspect's home
was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and concluding that "[w]here... the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant") United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 707-17 (1984) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where police used an
electronic tracking device to track a suspected drug conspirator's movement into several
private homes, because use of the tracking device gave police access to information that
would ordinarily have been concealed inside the privacy of people's homes)United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279-85 (1983) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where police
used an electronic device to track the location of a car owned by a suspected member of a
drug conspiracy, because the information exposed was merely the car's location, which could
have been obtained entirely through publicly available information, by following the car at a
distance). The differing outcomes in Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo, respectively, seem to turn not
on any link to physical invasions of property (which both Knotts and Karo contain and which
Kyllo does not) but on the extent to which previously hidden and private matters are newly
exposed through the use of the particular technology in question.
18. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 819-24. Kerr argues:
Katz is correctly decided from the standpoint of [a] loose property-based approach ....
Charles Katz became entitled to Fourth Amendment protection in the public phone booth
when he 'pa[id] the toll that permit[ted] him to place a call,' because at that point he became
a legitimate user of the phone booth. In effect, Katz rented out the booth for the
'momentary' period of his call much like a hotel guest rents out a hotel room for the night.
Like the hotel guest gaining Fourth Amendment rights in the hotel room during his
stay, Katz acquired the owner's privacy rights in the phone booth during the period of his
phone call.
Id at 820-21. (citations omitted).
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hypothetical brain-reader device all share in common the attribute of
leaving traditional property rights untouched. No physical trespass
need occur. But does that mean that the Fourth Amendment -
drafted and ratified in a simpler time, when the overlap between
invasions of property and invasions of privacy was more complete -
has no bearing on these activities? To the extent that original
understanding bears on constitutional law, it is sensible to attribute a
concern about privacy to the founding generation and to the text of
the Fourth Amendment itself.
In the late eighteenth century, someone who cared deeply about
privacy could secure its effective protection by writing an amendment
that guaranteed the people a robust right of security in their houses,
papers, and effects. Such an amendment would automatically cover
privacy interests as well. In a world where privacy and property were
so intimately linked, it would have seemed unnecessary to craft a
separate protection for privacy per se, particularly when the Fourth
Amendment includes a right of security in one's "person" - an
extension beyond contemporary notions of property that might have
seemed adequate to cover any unusual invasions of privacy that failed
to trespass upon real property or personal effects. The right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, in historical
context, thus necessarily encompassed privacy.
As the world changed, however, and invasions of privacy without
invasions of property became possible and increasingly likely, Fourth
Amendment doctrine had to adapt. As no less an originalist than
Judge Bork argued in the First Amendment context, "it is the task of
the judge in this generation to discern how the framers' values, defined
in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world
we know."19
Accordingly, even on jurisprudentially conservative premises, one
can legitimately interpret the Fourth Amendment as protecting
privacy independent of property. Though privacy historically received
protection primarily through the exercise of property rights, it is
inappropriate to assume that only the property rights survive within
the Fourth Amendment domain when property and privacy become
disconnected from each other - as in the case of technologies that
permit invasive long-distance surveillance without physical trespass.
Far more plausible is the claim that because property and privacy were
(as Kerr implicitly observes) historically tied so closely to one another,
it would not have seemed necessary to the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourth Amendment to craft a separate amendment to protect the
privacy that did not arise from a property right. Instead, the Fourth
Amendment, by going to the trouble of explicitly guarding security in
19. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
March 20041
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houses, persons, papers, and effects, would naturally be understood to
recognize the value of privacy in all of its incarnations.
Of course, outside of new technologies, it remains the case that one
can expect the greatest ability to enjoy privacy and exclude unwanted
others in locations that one owns or rents. To the extent that a person
does not own or exercise dominion over a place, enjoyment of privacy
rights develops by custom and understanding (and law) rather than by
a clearly designated and historically entrenched bundle of rights.
Nonetheless, privacy is important and valued, whether within or
outside of the property context. That may indeed be what motivated
the Supreme Court to hold in Kyllo2° that the use of a thermal
detection device to investigate the contents of an individual's home
implicates the Fourth Amendment in (more or less) the same way as
physically entering the home and looking at its contents would.2
Rather than demonstrating a misunderstanding of physics, as Kerr
suggests,22 the decision in Kyllo instead demonstrates a sophisticated
appreciation of how privacy independently contributes to the security
of one's house. Through that appreciation, the Court finds that
unwanted exposure is as inimical to security when it occurs through
thermal detection as it is when police enter one's home to observe
what happens inside. Properly understood, Kyllo is therefore not an
anomaly in its fidelity to privacy nor is it a property decision; rather,
Kyllo stands out precisely because property and privacy are separated
in the case of the technology at issue, and privacy still survives.
Even before the advent of the newest computer technologies, of
course, courts on occasion protected privacy in cases where property
played little or no role. Examples include the content of telephone
conversations in public booths23 (though Kerr correctly notes the
20. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
21. Id. at 34 ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search - at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."(internal citations
omitted)).
22. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 833 n.200.
The difficulty is that under Kyllo the frequency of light determines whether it receives
Fourth Amendment protection. Light in the visible spectrum does not receive Fourth
Amendment protection: looking at an object using human eyes is not search. However, light
in the infrared spectrum is protected by the Fourth Amendment, at least when the object
emitting the infrared light is a home. From the standpoint of physics, this is something like
saying that the government needs a search warrant to look at blue objects but not red
objects.
Id.
Rather than show fidelity to traditional property rights, however, as Kerr claims, the
Kyllo decision represents a refusal to ignore the privacy that once received automatic
protection from existing property law but now (due to technological innovation) may be
violated without touching existing property entitlements.
23. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-54.
[Vol. 102:889
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decline of such spaces with the rise of mobile phones); and the
chemical composition of one's urine.24
In the past, because privacy tended to correspond most closely with
the ability to exclude others physically, it followed that privacy rights
would closely track (although not mirror entirely) property rights.
Kerr makes an important contribution in showing that interests in
privacy and physical rights in property become less tied to each other
with the advent of new technologies such as thermal detection devices
and the Internet. Two questions arise out of this development, both of
which Kerr answers in the negative. First, has the Court's doctrine up
until this point indicated that privacy - apart from its incidental
connection to property rights - will receive protection under the
Fourth Amendment? And second, is it normatively appropriate for
the Court to apply Fourth Amendment doctrines to new, developing
technologies? Insofar as the first question calls for a descriptive
account of the post-Katz cases, I respectfully disagree with Kerr's
characterization.
Kerr notes that many of the cases following Katz reached the same
results as those decided prior to Katz and that, further, many refer
explicitly to such things as the lack of physical trespass or disruption of
property to rule out a putative reasonable expectation of privacy.25
Examples include what I have termed the "pretend friend" line of
cases, which permit the government to freely utilize informants
24. See Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 170 (2002). In that article, I
discussed several cases in which the Court considered the Fourth Amendment implications
of testing the chemical composition of one's urine. E.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67 (2001) (finding that, absent consent, a hospital had violated the Fourth Amendment
rights of several of its female patients who had sought obstetrical care, by performing drug
tests on those patients in a manner aimed at providing evidence to the police; the Court held
that such drug testing constituted a search triggering the application of Fourth Amendment
safeguards). But see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding a
public school program that subjected student athletes to random drug tests, where the test
results would be maintained confidentially, separate from the student's other records, and
released only to school personnel on a "need to know" basis). See also Colb, supra note 6, at
1709 (criticizing as counterintuitive the holding and reasoning in Smayda v. United States
352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965). Colb observes:
In Smayda, the petitioners were convicted of engaging in oral copulation with each other
through a hole carved between two stalls within a restroom in Yosemite National Park,
in violation of California law. Police [had] ... arranged for a hole to be cut in the ceiling
over each stall, "for purposes of observation." [Many were observed using the restroom
stall for various purposes even though [t]he police ... lacked individualized suspicion
prior to any individual bathroom viewing. The Court of Appeals held that there was still
no Fourth Amendment violation, reasoning that "when people resort to such a public
toilet for criminal purposes, they deliberately take the chance that they may be observed
by police officers, and that they are not protected from such observation" - a waiver
argument. The court added that, alternatively, no search had occurred, because "these
stalls were, in essence, a public place." (citations omitted).
Id.
25. Kerr, supra note 1, at 815-25.
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wearing wires and recording devices to form relationships with private
people, without probable cause, a warrant, or any level of suspicion.
26
Because such practices obviously invade privacy, Kerr argues, it
follows that the Court has not truly been interested in protecting
privacy that does not happen to intersect with property rights.
I interpret these and other cases differently. First, the use of
deception to enter a private home strikes me as directly implicating
interests in property as well as privacy, because both are part and
parcel of the right to exclude people from one's house. Using
deception to do what would otherwise constitute trespass, then, is no
more respectful of property rights than using deception to acquire
visual and aural access to private areas and conversations is respectful
of privacy rights. With respect to both property and privacy, the Court
demonstrates an assumption of risk approach - if you trust people,
you do so at your own peril - that fails to keep faith with either a
property or privacy conception of Fourth Amendment rights.
As I argued in a recent article,27 this approach (of equating risk of
exposure with actual exposure) is inappropriate, because the
government has an obligation to act in a normatively appropriate way
and thereby to expose people to no greater intrusion than would exist
in the world of purely private interactions. In other words, rather than
inadvertently but faithfully developing a property-based Fourth
Amendment doctrine, the Court has erroneously embraced an
improper "move" in sincerely attempting to apply the Fourth
Amendment to protect reasonable expectations of privacy. I identify
this move as the equation between taking a risk of exposure (however
remote in the world of private actors), on the one hand, and acting in a
manner that knowingly exposes one's private matters, on the other.'
Kerr acknowledges that in some of the case law, including United
States v. Knotts,29 United States v. Karo, ° and Kyllo v. United States,31
"the Court has deviated from a strict focus on how the technology
works and instead created rules to preserve the degree of surveillance
26. See Colb, supra note 24, at 139-40 (characterizing "pretend friend" cases). Colb
characterizes "pretend friend" cases as those in which the government:
[B]ehaves like an intimate who betrays a friend's trust .... In reviewing challenges to
various undercover operations, the Court has held that nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prevents a government agent from feigning a relationship with a person and
thereby insinuating himself into the person's confidence .... [T]he Court recognizes no
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's friends." (citations omitted).
Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 126-27.
29. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
30. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
31. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
[Vol. 102:889
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authority in the home that property law principles have traditionally
allowed. 3 2 He claims, however, that rather than suggesting a privacy-
based Fourth Amendment, "a better reading is that these cases are
essentially conservative, based on the primacy of property law to the
Fourth Amendment.
33
Kerr attempts to reconcile Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo with his
property-based view of the Fourth Amendment precedents by saying
that the Court simply shifts its focus from "how the information was
obtained - the usual inquiry - [to] what information was obtained 34
in order "to retain the very core of traditional Fourth Amendment
protections: the protection of information about the home traditionally
enforced by property law."" But in observing the shift in focus, from
how a surveillance method works to what the method exposes, Kerr
implicitly acknowledges that the Court in these cases has decided to
protect privacy (or, as in one of the cases, to reject a Fourth
Amendment claim when privacy is not implicated) regardless of
whether the surveillance method in fact makes it possible to invade
privacy without transgressing any existing property rights. In other
words, Kerr's attempt to reconcile these three cases with a view of
property as primary fails precisely because privacy could previously
have been characterized as only incidentally protected by property
rights but can no longer be so characterized once it receives
protection, even when there is no property trespass involved at all.
Though I take issue with the Court's notion that everyone can
already follow a car's whereabouts in public (in the way that a tracking
device permits),3 6 it is clear that the Court's analysis, however flawed,
rests on a conception of privacy from public observation that exists
independently of property rights (one of which property rights, as Kerr
notes,37 ordinarily includes an interest in not having things affixed to
32. Kerr, supra note 1, at 830.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 831.
35. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
36. See Colb, supra note 24, at 132-37. I criticized Knotts "because people do not expect
to be followed when they move about in public areas," see id. at 134, and further faulted the
Knotts/Karo distinction as failing to correspond to people's actual concerns about privacy
from exposure. Id at 134-37.
37. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 821 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV 458
U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982), in which the Court found an installation similar to the tape recorder
involved in Katz to be a direct taking of property, which required just compensation to the
owner. In Loretto, an apartment building owner protested the state-sanctioned installation
on her building of cable television boxes and associated wires. The Court characterized the
placement of the boxes as a "permanent physical occupation" of the owner's property. Kerr
argues that the same logic applies to Katz. In particular, Kerr suggests that in Katz, the
government installed the device on a property that Katz had rented (i.e., the phone booth),
and used information obtained through that invasion of Katz's property to procure damaging
evidence against him).
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one's property, as the tracking device must be in both Knotts, where
the Court did not find a violation, and Karo, where it did). Kyllo is yet
another instance in which the usual freedom from public observation
that one enjoys inside one's home generates a privacy-regarding ruling
regulating the use of heat detection technology to discern goings-on
within the house even absent an invasion of a property right. Though
Kerr finds the analysis anomalous (mocking, for example, the
distinction between visible and invisible light waves),38 it is entirely in
keeping with a Fourth Amendment approach that regards as sacred
the individual's right to keep out public observation of her home, i.e.,
the "privacy" dimension of private property.
In yet another case that implicates privacy but not property, the
Court decided implicitly in Ferguson v. City of Charleston39 that
informed consent was a necessary precondition, as a matter of Fourth
Amendment law, to the legality of testing the chemical composition of
a public hospital patient's urine (for cocaine, in this case). Though one
does not own the urine that leaves one's body (particularly when one
has voluntarily agreed to give doctors a sample), the Court indicated
that the privacy of its contents (beyond the facts medically necessary
for treating the patient's condition) retains Fourth Amendment
protection.
II. NORMATIVE INQUIRY
Normatively, Kerr poses the critical Fourth Amendment question
presented by new technologies as involving a choice between judicial
protection of privacy and congressional (or state legislative) protection
of privacy. Kerr argues that because Congress has so far done a good
job of protecting privacy in the area of technology, and because the
judiciary has tended to fall behind the curve in protecting privacy (for
various institutional reasons), Congress is a sensible repository for our
trust in securing privacy, while the judiciary is not.
Yet Kerr offers a false choice between courts and legislatures.
Judicial protection of Fourth Amendment privacy from technological
intrusion hardly bars similar or additional protection by Congress. In
some instances in which the Supreme Court has decided not to protect
privacy, Kerr notes that Congress has filled the gap.4 For example,
after the Court ruled that people have no reasonable expectation of
38. See supra note 22.
39. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
40. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 837 (asserting that "[aidditional privacy protections are
needed to fill the gap between the protections that a reasonable person might want and what
the Fourth Amendment actually provides" and that "those protections historically have
come from Congress").
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privacy in their bank records,4' Congress enacted the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, which imposes Fourth Amendment-like
restrictions on government access to such records. 2 To the extent that
the Supreme Court or other courts similarly failed to keep up with the
times, there would be nothing to stop Congress from doing the same in
the area of technology. Having two separate government bodies
protecting privacy, moreover, does not create conflict, because the
roles of the two branches are distinct from each other. It is the courts'
job to interpret the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. By contrast, Congress may extend protection
beyond that covered by the Constitution as a matter of majoritarian
preferences.
To be sure, there would be the potential for conflict if the Court
systematically overprotected privacy. In those circumstances, as a
matter of constitutional law, Congress could not "correct" the Court's
errors through ordinary legislation. Kerr's arguments, however, (which
I find persuasive on this point) indicate that where the Court errs it
will typically err in underprotecting privacy. In those circumstances,
Congress can generally provide supplemental protection without any
conflict.
Indeed, because the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test calls
for an inquiry about how much privacy people would have in the
absence of law enforcement surveillance, Congress can generate new
and more protective norms about privacy simply by limiting the
amount of exposure that individuals must suffer at the hands of other
private parties who have access to technological tools of surveillance.
The relationship between the two branches can therefore be
complimentary rather than conflicting, and in any event, there is no
principle that bars Congress from continuing to protect privacy in the
beneficial ways that it has done in the past.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, from a practical
perspective, Congress does not (as the Court does under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments) have the authority to regulate the
behavior of state governments without an affirmative grant of power.
The Commerce Clause is one such affirmative grant, but not all state
and local threats to privacy would trigger application of the Commerce
Clause. 43 Thus the Fourth Amendment (as incorporated through the
41. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-45 (1976).
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000).
43. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000) (holding that neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided
Congress with the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)); see also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made
the knowing possession of a firearm within a school zone a federal crime).
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Fourteenth Amendment) could be a crucial source of authority for
congressional privacy legislation.
If the Fourth Amendment in fact protects privacy, then Congress
may pass legislation to effectuate that constitutional right under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the legislation
goes substantially beyond what the Court says the Fourth Amendment
itself requires. If, however, as Kerr claims, the Fourth Amendment
does not protect privacy in the area of new technology, then
congressional efforts to regulate state invasions of privacy would likely
be deemed too distant from any constitutional interest recognized by
the Court to count as valid action under the Section Five power."
Kerr is correct to suggest that Congress can achieve a great deal by
regulating private actors," such as banks and internet service
providers, because they are often the source for law enforcement's
acquisition of technologically created private material. Congress can
regulate them as actors in interstate commerce. But when state police
themselves (or, as will increasingly become the case, technologically
educated employees who work for the police) invade individuals'
privacy in technologically advanced ways, Congress may not have the
power to protect privacy from such invasions.
Perhaps most fundamentally, Kerr's argument that Congress alone
should be entrusted with protecting privacy because it does a better
job than the Court when new technologies are involved is a non
sequitur. If in fact the Fourth Amendment provides a constitutional
right to privacy, then the Court has an affirmative obligation to apply
that right to new contexts, just as it has an obligation to protect the
First Amendment or the Fifth Amendment when previously
unimagined threats to the rights of free speech or freedom from
compelled self-incrimination arise. The Supreme Court and lower
federal courts, in other words, are charged with the responsibility of
saying what the Constitution means and applying it to factual
scenarios presented by litigants. If Congress does a smashing job of
44. As the Court's recent decision upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act's
application to states demonstrates, there is a crucial doctrinal difference between a federal
statute that extends further protection to an interest the Court's doctrine already recognizes
as special (such as the interest in avoiding sex discrimination), and a federal statute that
purports to "enforce" constitutional rights that the Court says don't exist in the first place.
See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735-36 (2003) (distinguishing cases
in which the Court forbade Congress's extension of constitutional protection against
discrimination that, under the Court's precedents, would only trigger low-level scrutiny). In
other words, Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce" existing
constitutional rights against the states is far broader than its power to protect rights that the
Court has said are not found in the Constitution.
45. See Kerr, supra note 1, at 854-855 (stating, for example, that "Congress enacted the
Right to Financial Privacy Act to protect the privacy of bank records" and that "Congress's
handiwork in the field of Internet surveillance law offers a promising framework" (citations
omitted)).
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protecting privacy, then litigants will have recourse to legislative and
constitutional arguments when they appear in court. But the
availability of one kind of protection does not and should not preclude
the availability of the other. To refuse to enter into the thicket of
Fourth Amendment rights against new technologies, in other words,
would be an abdication of the courts' responsibilities.
The real normative and empirical questions, then, are, respectively,
whether the Fourth Amendment ought to be read, and whether it has
been read, to protect privacy in addition to and independent of any
link to property. Kerr answers the latter question in the negative:
doctrinally, he argues, the post-Katz cases can best be explained as
applications of a Fourth Amendment right of property, broadly
construed. As I have already explained, this reading of the precedents
is strained. The normative question, however, does not necessarily
turn on this answer. If, in fact, it is a mistake to apply the Fourth
Amendment to privacy, then any doctrinal suggestion to the contrary
ought to be rejected for the future, and what better place to do it than
a context in which property is no longer at issue?
So we face the normative question: Is it a mistake to protect
privacy? Professor William Stuntz has put forward that suggestion.46 If
Stuntz is right that privacy is not valuable, then it makes perfect sense
to reject the application of Fourth Amendment law to technology,
where only privacy but not property is at issue. But I think Stuntz is
wrong,47 and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, so does
Kerr. Kerr clearly does value privacy; he praises rather than laments
congressional vigilance in stepping into the void to protect privacy
from technological invasion. He apparently views privacy as an
important value, but one located primarily outside of the Fourth
Amendment.
As I have argued, Kerr's analysis does not support his conclusion.
Fourth Amendment doctrine does not purport to protect privacy
merely when it is tied to property, but actually, and appropriately (if
imperfectly), protects privacy, even from governmental invasions
accomplished through new technology when property rights are not
directly implicated. Kerr may be correct that Congress is as good as or
better than the courts at protecting privacy, but absent some reason to
think that the courts will systematically overprotect privacy, the fact
that we can generally rely upon the democratic process is no reason to
forego the additional protection for individual rights that the judiciary
affords for those occasions when majority rule threatens to become
majority tyranny.
46. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1048 (1995) (arguing that "[i]f we could start over, perhaps privacy
would not receive constitutional protection anywhere" (emphasis omitted)).
47. See Colb, supra note 6, passim.
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